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Comments and Casenotes
Military Jurisdiction Over Discharged Servicemen
United States v. Quarles1
In May, 1953, five months after being honorably dis-
charged from the Air Force, Robert W. Toth was arrested
at his place of employment in Pennsylvania by military
police on the charge of having murdered and conspired to
murder a Korean national while serving with the Air Force
in Korea. He was immediately flown to Korea to stand trial
by court-martial, and while he was there awaiting trial, a
petition for habeas corpus was made on his behalf to the
District Court for the District of Columbia,2 contesting the
constitutionality of Article 3(a) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. Article 3 (a) provides:
"Subject to the provisions of section 618 of this title,
any person charged with having committed, while in
a status in which he was subject to this chapter, an
offense against this chapter, punishable by confine-
ment of five years or more and for which the person
cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or
any State or Territory thereof or of the District of
Columbia, shall not be relieved from amenability to
trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of
said status."'
Upon hearing on the rule to show cause,4 the District
Court, Holtzoff, J., declined to pass on the constitutionality
of Article 3(a) since the court-martial jurisdiction had not
yet been exercised, but issued the order on the grounds that
the Uniform Code of Military Justice provided no method
of arrest or provision for preliminary hearing or removal,
and that therefore the military police arresting Toth had
no greater power than private citizens. At the hearing on
the return of the writ,5 the court reaffirmed the statement
1350 U. S. ... , 76 S. Ct. 1 (1955).
2Toth v. Talbott, 113 F. Supp. 330 (D. C., D. C., 1953).
150 U. S. C. A., Sec. 553(a) (1951 ed.). This section was intended to
remedy such situations as Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U. S. 210 (1949), in which
the Supreme Court invalidated court-martial proceedings against a naval en-
listed man for an offense committed during a prior enlistment, although only
one day had elapsed between discharge and reenlistment.
'Supra, n. 2.
'Toth v. Talbott, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D. C., D. C., 1953).
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that the military police had no authority to arrest Toth and
held that even if they had such authority, they had none to
transport him to a distant point for trial.' The writ., was
sustained and petitioner discharged. Upon appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the District disposed of the lower
court's ruling on the ground that the statute in making Toth
amenable to court-martial jurisdiction implied the power
to apprehend and remove.7 The court discussed the consti-
tutionality of Article 3(a) and held it constitutional.' The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to pass upon this
question.9
The court refused to sustain the provision as an exer-
cise of either the Congressional power to raise and support
armies, to declare war, or punish offenses against the law
of nations; or the President's power as commander-in-chief;
or as an exercise of martial law; and held that Congress
had no power to "subject civilians like Toth to trial by
court-martial". ° The court, by Mr. Justice Black, reasoned
that:
"... any expansion of court-martial jurisdiction like
that in the 1950 Act necessarily encroaches on the juris-
diction of federal courts set up under Article III of the
Constitution where persons on trial are surrounded
with more constitutional safeguards than in military
tribunals."'1
In rejecting the argument that if the law were invali-
dated, discharged service men would go unpunished for
crimes committed while in service, the court referred to
the Congressional hearings at which the alternative of
granting jurisdiction to the federal courts was discussed,
and said:
"It is conceded that it was wholly within the con-
stitutional power of Congress to follow this suggestion
and provide for federal district court trials of dis-
charged soldiers accused of offenses committed while
in the armed services. 12
The argument that service discipline would be adversely
affected was also rejected as unsound, and the court con-
cluded:
Albid, 469.
Talbott v. United States, 215 F. 2d 22, 31 (D. C. App., 1954).
8 Ibid, 26.
United States v. Talbott, 348 U. S. 809 (1954).
10 Supra, n. 1, 8.
n Ibid, 4.
Ibid, 7.
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"We hold that Congress cannot subject civilians like
Toth to trial by court-martial. They, like other civilians,
are entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded
those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article
III of the Constitution."' s
Mr. Justice Reed, joined by Justices Burton and Minton
in dissenting, found sufficient constitutional authority in
the power "To make Rules for the Government and Regu-
lation of the land and naval Forces" granted in Article III,
Section 8, of the Constitution. The effect of the decision,
the dissent noted, was to destroy forever for all practical
purposes a method that Congress deemed effective for crime
correction. The decision released "without trial or possi-
bility of trial, a man accused of murder", 4 and brings
Congress again face to face with the problem of punishing
those guilty of crimes committed while in a military status
who escape detection until after discharge. The alternative
act giving jurisdiction to the federal courts will, doubtless,
soon be passed by Congress, its constitutionality assured by
the dictum in this case, but for practical purposes the three
million former servicemen now in civilian status, are be-
yond the reach of the law, for any crimes they may have
committed for which they were not at the time of commis-
sion answerable in the state or federal courts.
This case brings to the foreground one phase of the
larger problem of the extent to which civilian citizens are
amenable to trial by military tribunal. 5 There are three
classes of cases involved: (1) trial of civilians in a quasi
military status; (2) trial of civilians in an area under mar-
tial law; and (3) trial of civilians discharged from a former
military status."
- Ibid, 8.
" Ibid, 9.
5 As used herein, military tribunal includes courts-martial, military com-
missions, and occupation courts in the nature of military commissions.
Oourts-martial are provided for by Congress, U. C. M. J., Arts. 16-29, 50
U. S. C. A., Secs. 576-593 (1951 ed.), under Article 1, Sec. 8, of the Constitu-
tion. Jurisdiction does not exclude that of military commissions, U. C.
M. J., Art. 21, 50 U. S. C. A., Sec. 581 (1951 ed.). Military commissions are
discussed In Madsen v. Kinsella, infra, n. 20, at 348, as follows: "In the
absence of attempts by Congress 'to limit the President's power, it appears
that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the Jurisdiction and pro-
cedure of military commissions,..., in territory occupied by Armed Forces
of the United States. His authority to do this sometimes survives the cessa-
tion of hostilities." For trial of non-citizens by military commission within
territorial United States, see infra, n. 16.
" For the amenability of non-citizens, see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1
(1942), holding that enemy agents entering the country in time of war
were properly tried by military commission.
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Certain civilians are amenable to trial by military tri-
bunal because of their quasi-military status. Article 2 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice17 subjects to court-
martial jurisdiction all persons serving with or accompany-
ing the armed forces in the field in time of war; ". . . all
persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the
armed forces without the continental limits of the United
States . . ." and certain territories;" and ". . . all persons
within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired
for the use of the United States which is under the control
of the Secretary of a Department . . ." and which is with-
out certain territories.19 An illustrative case of this class is
the recent case of Madsen v. Kinsella,° involving the trial
in occupied enemy territory by military commission of a
civilian wife who had accompanied her Air Force husband
into the United States Area of Control in Germany. In
upholding her trial and conviction, the court stated:
"'Both United States courts-martial, and United
States Military Commissions or tribunals in the nature
of such commissions, had jurisdiction in Germany in
1949-1950 to try persons in the status of petitioner on
the charge against her."'"
There seems to be little doubt that civilian citizens may
be tried by military tribunals in areas of the United States
under martial law. The limitation on military jurisdiction
in this class goes rather to the situations under which
martial law can be declared, the leading case being Ex parte
Milligan.22 Milligan, a civilian resident of Indiana, an area
claimed to be under martial law, was arrested by order of
the military commander of the district and tried before a
military commission for offenses against the United States.
He was convicted and imprisoned under sentence of death,
and upon petition for habeas corpus the Supreme Court
1150 U. S. C. A., See. 552 (11) (1951 ed.).
The territories excepted are "That part of Alaska east of longitude one
hundred and seventy-two degrees west, the Canal Zone, the main group of
the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, .... " Ibid.
19Ibid, Sec. 552 (12).
343 U. S. 341 (1952).2
'Ibid, 345. See also: In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (E. D. Ohio, 1944),
merchant seaman on military transport ship; McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F.
Supp. 80 (E. D. Va., 1943) same, on troop transport ship; In re Di Bartolo,
50 F. Supp. 929 (S. D. N. Y., 1943), civilian employed by a government
contractor operating a military installation within an area of military
operations.
214 Wall-ace 2 (U. S., 1866). Note that unlike the Madsen case discussed
above, which arose under military occupation government, this is a case
arising under an attempt to impose martial law in the United States.
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held that "Martial rule can never exist where the courts
are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of
their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual
war.''2 In noting that the Constitution gave power to Con-
gress to provide for trial of persons connected with the
military service, the court stated, "All other persons, citi-
zens of states where the courts are open, if charged with
crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial
by jury."24
United States v. Quarles has clarified the law in the
third class of cases. Civilian citizens are not amenable to
military trial for crimes committed in their prior military
status, though they may be tried by the federal courts if
Congress so directs.
LOWELL R. Bowm
Recovery Of Money Paid Under A Mistake Of Law
Baltimore & Annapolis R. Co. v. Carolina Coach Co.1
In 1950, under the terms of a sub-lease of a bus terminal
from the Baltimore and Annapolis Railroad Co., appellant,
to the Red Star Motor Line, both parties were to have joint
control over one designated ticket agent and the lessee was
given the right to pay the salary of this employee and
to deduct this amount of money from its monthly rent pay-
ment, should it elect to do so. Red Star paid the entire
salary of this employee until December 1950, when he re-
signed and was replaced by another ticket agent, who was
paid entirely by B. & A. until January, 1953. During the
first period (ending December 1950), Red Star deducted
from its rent payments an amount equal to only the
salary of the ticket agent, even though it was paying his
entire salary. During the second period (from December
'50 to January '53), B. & A. paid the entire salary and added
an amount of money equal to one half of the salary of the
"Ibid, 127. An interesting case arising during World War II In this
area was Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304 (1946), holding that
"martial law" in the Hawaiian Organic Act, while authorizing vigorous
military action to preserve order and defend the Islands, did not authorize
the supplanting of the courts by military tribunals.
Ibid, 123. For the separate but related problem of enforcement of
military orders by the federal courts, see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U. S. 81 (1943), upholding the conviction of petitioner for violation of a
curfew order promulgated by the military commander pursuant to an act
of Congress during World War II.
1206 Md. 237, 111 A. 2d 464 (1955).
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